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Legalization and Recognition of Gangsters in Indonesia

The Legalization and Formal Recognition of Gangsters (Preman) as Mass Organizations (Ormas) in Indonesia: Historical and Sociopolitical Dynamics

Introduction

The phenomenon of gangsters—known locally as preman—becoming legally recognized, organized, and even celebrated through official mass organizations (ormas) is a striking feature of contemporary Indonesian society. Once feared as violent underworld figures, many preman now operate under the banner of registered organizations, occupying a grey area between criminality, populist activism, and political utility. This transformation did not occur in a vacuum; it is deeply rooted in Indonesia’s historical, cultural, and political evolution. The convergence of state interests with criminal power, militarized vigilantism, and patron-client networks has yielded a unique Indonesian model where social bandits, revolutionaries, and outright extortionists can morph into legal, sometimes even state-endorsed actors.

This report delves into the origins and development of the preman phenomenon, the pivotal roles played by vigilante, paramilitary, and militia groups from pre-colonial times through the New Order under Soeharto, and the formalization process leading to today’s landscape of legalized gangster ormas. Drawing from a wide array of historical and contemporary sources, the analysis explores the structural, legal, and political mechanisms that have enabled and sustained this phenomenon, with a focus on case studies and the present-day impact.

I. Historical Context: Origins of Premanism in Indonesia

1.1. Pre-Colonial and Colonial Foundations

The roots of premanism in Indonesia extend back centuries, predating colonialism. In Javanese society, figures known as jago (rooster, champion) and later jawara (warrior, particularly in Banten) acted as strongmen—serving local communities as both protectors and, at times, extortionists or enforcers246.

  • Jago were local toughs regarded as protectors or dispute settlers, combining physical prowess, mystical aura (ilmu kebal or invulnerability), and social charisma. In rural or weakly governed areas, they filled power vacuums, offering “order” where the state or aristocratic elites could not3.
  • In colonial Java, jago and jawara often became intermediaries between colonial officials (priyayi, Dutch authorities) and the peasantry. They were vital in tax collection, forced labor recruitment, and local law enforcement—at once co-opted by colonial power and constantly at risk of being cast as outlaws73.
  • The ambiguous status of these figures reflected a broader symbiosis between informal violence and state authority, setting precedents for later collaboration between government and strongmen.

Table 1: Key Developments in the Early Evolution of Strongmen Groups

PeriodFigure/GroupRole/StatusImpact
Pre-colonialJago, WarokLocal protector, banditInformal dispute resolution, peasant protection, proto-justice
Dutch colonialJago, Jawara, PremanPower brokers/intermediariesEnabled colonial control, suppressed as outlaws during anti-colonial moments
19th Century Java/BantenJawaraBandit and protectorReinforced patron-client and cultural legitimacy; involved in resistance as well as violence

This early embedding of the preman/jago/jawara within local society—alternately feared and respected—has been extensively documented by scholars, who note their “social bandit” status was both romanticized and operationalized for the purposes of rule43.

1.2. Crime Syndicates under Dutch Colonial and Japanese Occupation

As Dutch rule deepened, the need for local “fixers” increased. Preman became part of the power infrastructure, acting as unofficial agents of taxation, labor conscription, and law enforcement74. They worked alongside the priyayi but were often outside formal structures. Notably:

  • In times of crisis—tax revolts, famines, or the Banten peasant uprising (1888)—preman bands often turned against colonial authorities, invoking both local grievances and millenarian beliefs in justice.
  • The term preman itself derives from the Dutch vrijman (“free man”), originally referring to non-slave day laborers operating outside formal contracts but later acquiring a reputation for lawlessness, extortion, and independent power12.

Under Japanese occupation (1942–1945), the relationship between criminal syndicates and political power deepened. The Japanese recruited strongmen—jago, underworld figures—into auxiliary security units, and many preman joined clandestine resistance or nationalist formations that would later become the seeds of revolutionary militias1.

1.3. The Jago and Jawara During the Indonesian National Revolution (1945–49)

The Indonesian revolution was a period of heightened fluidity in the roles of jago, jawara, and emerging preman as state and society underwent profound upheaval:

  • In many regions, jago and jawara became military and political leaders. Released from colonial prisons, they recruited bands for revolutionary purposes—fighting both the Dutch and, at times, their social or ideological rivals910.
  • Prominent examples include Haji Darip, Imam Syafe’i, and Panji, whose influence derived as much from “magical” authority as from connections with emerging nationalist factions9.
  • In Banten, the jawara played critical roles in resisting colonial and Japanese remnants, forming local councils (Dewan Rakyat) and conducting raids that blurred the lines between revolutionary idealism and banditry.
  • Muslim groups such as Hizbullah and Sabilillah provided religious legitimacy and paramilitary structure, further complicating the mix of crime, militancy, and revolution12.

This revolutionary era forged deep links between strongmen and political movements, introducing patterns of collaboration and co-optation between formal and informal violence that would crystallize in later decades15.

II. Key Events: Preman, Vigilantes, and State-Building from the 1950s to 1960s

2.1. Post-Independence: The Emergence of Paramilitaries and Vigilante Groups

Indonesia’s early post-independence years were marked by instability, insurgencies, and frequent use of irregular, semi-legal violence by all actors:

  • Former revolutionary lasykar (militia) members, unable to integrate into the professional military or find work, often went back to predatory or protective roles—sometimes organizing as criminal syndicates, sometimes as political bandits3.
  • New “security groups” and self-defense militias emerged, filling gaps left by weak state policing and legal institutions. These included “Buru Jejak” in Lombok and indigenous protection groups in Kalimantan, which quickly developed reputations for violence and patronage-based justice.

Table 2: Early Post-Independence Security Dynamics

Actor/GroupOrigin/CompositionPolitical FunctionSocio-legal Status
LasykarEx-guerrillas, ex-premanLocal defense, crime control, militiaSemi-legal, sometimes outlaw
Buru JejakEx-criminals, local farmersLivestock protection, political toolBlurred legal recognition
Hizbullah etcMuslim santri/youthsParamilitary, religious authorityAbsorbed into the TNI (army)
Jawara/PremanJago, ex-prisoners, “pahlawan”Village protection, racketeeringOften criminal, sometimes tolerated

The state, facing multiple insurgencies and secessionist threats, regularly subcontracted policing and repression functions to these groups, reinforcing the social and economic relevance of preman-style violence15.

2.2. Political-Military Alliance and the 1965–66 Mass Killings

The Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66 marked the most decisive moment for the syncretism of state power and gangsterism in Indonesia:

  • In the lead-up to the 30 September Movement (G30S/PKI), the army had increasingly mobilized civilian militias and shock troops to counter the growing power of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).
  • After the attempted coup, the Army (under Soeharto) directed a systematic extermination of real and suspected communists, outsourcing much of the violence to irregular forces: vigilante groups, youth organizations, religious militias, and, crucially, preman networks17.

Key features of this period:

  • Army officers provided weapons, lists, and legal impunity, while preman and mass organizations acted as local executioners;
  • Muslim organizations (Ansor, Sabilillah, Muhammadiyah) and mafia-style gangs joined in, ensuring that the violence was both organized and decentralized—a perfect environment for institutionalizing informal violence191.
  • The willingness of the Army to rely on these groups, and later reward them, established mutual dependency that would underpin the New Order regime.

Table 3: Events and Impact—The 1965–66 Killings and Their Legacy

EventDateImpact/MechanismLegacy
Mobilization of shock troopspre-October 1965Military trains, arms, and licenses “civilian” violenceSets precedent for collaboration
Mass killings (1965–66)1965–66Army and mass orgs coordinate exterminationStates grants impunity, inclusion in ormas
InstitutionalizationLate 1960sNew militias, ormas gain social powerLegal, financial, and political recognition

The massacre’s scale and breadth—over 500,000 killed by some estimates—entrenched the place of preman and vigilante groups within the state machinery as “defenders” of the nation1721.

III. The New Order: Formalization, Legalization, and The Golden Age of Gangster-Ormas

3.1. Soeharto’s Use of Vigilantes and Legal Reform

During Soeharto’s New Order (1966–1998), the confluence of power, violence, and criminality shifted from ad hoc alliances to formal structures. The regime’s priorities—order, repression of dissent, and national unity under Pancasila—were pursued with the active collaboration of paramilitary ormas that drew their membership from the preman underclass.

3.1.1. The Emergence of Pemuda Pancasila

  • Pemuda Pancasila (PP) was formed in 1959 by General Nasution and his allies, originally as a counterweight to the leftist Pemuda Rakyat22.
  • The group became a model for state-licensed gangsterism: its leaders and rank-and-file included notorious preman, but its formal mission was to “defend Pancasila”—making it a perfect proxy for anti-communist operations and political repression19.
  • During the 1965–66 mass killings, PP led many of the most violent pogroms against leftists and Chinese in North Sumatra and Jakarta, earning lasting impunity22.

Table 4: Pemuda Pancasila’s Historical Trajectory

PeriodFunction/ActivityRelationship to State
1959–1965Anti-communist, youth mobilizationArmy-aligned party vehicle (IPKI)
1965–1970sMilitia, mass killing, political intimidationDirect collaboration with Army
1980sSuppression of protest, extortion, racketeeringState-sanctioned, legal ormas
Post-1998Political mobilization, business, land clearingPolitical party-affiliated ormas

PP’s success inspired countless copycats (Pemuda Panca Marga, FBR, FPI), creating a competitive field of violent ormas, each seeking their own patronage1.

3.1.2. State Legalization of Ormas

The legal framework for mass organizations was set out in Laws and regulations such as Law No. 8/1985 and its later iterations (now Law No. 17/2013). These laws require ormas to adhere to national ideology (Pancasila), register with the state, and declare organizational structures—effectively channeling gangster groups into a legalistic mold25.

The state emerged as both patron and regulator. Preman groups, once outlaws, could now operate with organizational identity, bank accounts, and legal standing, provided they painted their mission in terms of “community service,” defense of values, or national unity25.

3.1.3. “Bekking,” Patron-Client Networks, and Integration

Critical to the system was the operation of political patronage networks:

  • Military, police, and elite “backers” (bekking) traded impunity and support for political loyalty, intimidation services, and a share of criminal profits (e.g., “japrem”, protection racket shares)2320.
  • Pemuda Pancasila and similar ormas effectively became agents of state-corporate crime, collecting illegal rents and providing “security” for both state and business (notably in resource-rich regions and urban centers).

Table 5: Patronage Structures and Gangster-Ormas Collaboration

NetworkPrincipal ActorsFunction/BenefitEnduring Impact
Military/PoliceSenior officers, elite politiciansImmunity, resourcesStructural impunity, protection
BureaucraticRegional officials, ormas leadersContract awards, jobsCorruption, “informal taxes”
PoliticalGolkar, local party bossesElectoral mobilizationEmbedded “muscle” in campaigns

Even the mass anti-crime campaigns—most dramatically, the petrus (“mysterious shootings”) of the early 1980s—served as ways to eliminate uncontrolled criminal (non-affiliated) preman, driving survivors to seek shelter in state-sanctioned ormas where operations could continue “legally”23.

3.2. Islamist Militias, Jawara Ormas, and Fragmented Power after Reformasi

3.2.1. The Rise of Islamist Vigilante Groups

After Soeharto’s resignation in 1998, Indonesia’s democratization and decentralization fueled a proliferation of Islamist and ethnic-based militias:

  • Organizations like Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Forum Betawi Rempug (FBR), and regional jawara ormas capitalized on political uncertainty, claiming to “defend morality” or “protect local interests.” Many drew from existing preman, vigilante, and former militia memberships.
  • These groups exploited weaknesses in law enforcement, rent-seeking and offering protection rackets to businesses, especially in urban and industrial zones31.
  • Some, like FBR in Jakarta, used religious and mystical legitimacy (ilmu ghaib) to appeal to marginalized populations and maintain disruptive power3.

3.2.2. Political Patronage and the Normalization of Ormas Power

As electoral competition, local autonomy, and civil society expanded, politicians increasingly utilized ormas—including gangster-linked ones—as mobs, campaign tools, and sources of “security”. These relationships were visible in:

  • The expansion of ormas into security service provision, “negotiating” with companies for exclusive rights, and explicit involvement in labor, land, or resource disputes;
  • Ormas leaders gaining seats in local or national legislatures, or running for office under party patronage;
  • Clashes between rival ormas for control over lucrative economic activities, often framed as “defending community interests” while serving elite or private business agendas31.

Table 6: Ormas Legalization and Integration Post-Reformasi

Reformasi Era ChangeImmediate ImpactLong-term Socio-political Consequence
Decentralization lawsLocal bosses, ormas empoweredFragmentation, local oligarchies, mass ormas registration
Party pluralismOrmas as campaign armsMobs-for-hire, competitive populism, politicization
Lax regulationExplosion in number of mass organizations (>600,000)Difficult governance, legalized extortion and predation

3.2.3. Case Study: John Kei and Angkatan Muda Kei (AMKEI)

The story of John Kei and his organization, AMKEI (Angkatan Muda Kei/Kei Youth Force), epitomizes the flexibility—and danger—of the gangster-ormas phenomenon:

  • Emerging from Jakarta’s debt collection underworld in the 1990s and 2000s, John Kei transformed his gang into AMKEI, claiming to represent the interests of Ambonese and Maluku youth in major urban centers3234.
  • While involved in high-profile murders and turf wars, AMKEI registered as a legal mass organization. Its leader was photographed with politicians and even took up a formal party membership34.
  • In the post-2010s, as AMKEI’s power ebbed and flowed with feuds, John Kei’s ability to surface as both a mafia “Don” and a legal ormas chairman demonstrates the permeability of boundaries between illegality and state legitimacy in Indonesia34.

IV. Contemporary Status: Impacts, Reforms, and Continuing Ambiguity

4.1. Ormas as Economic and Political Actors

Today, preman-derived ormas operate across a spectrum:

  • Many hold surprisingly legal status: properly registered, with bank accounts, tax IDs, and recognized leadership structures according to government regulations (e.g., Law No. 17/2013, PP No. 58/2016)25.
  • Their activities are spread across security services, labor supply, resource exploitation, informal taxation (protection money), and even cultural or religious “morality” enforcement31.
  • News reports and government documents reveal persistent public anxiety about ormas domination, extortion of businesses, and the normalization of violence as a tactic of negotiation36.

State response alternates between tolerance, crackdown, and attempts at co-optation. Most recently, task forces to combat premanism and problematic ormas have been launched, but the depth of embeddedness makes sustainable reform difficult36.

4.2. Historiographical Representation in Indonesian Scholarship

Scholars have repeatedly emphasized the uniquely Indonesian historical roots of premanism and the continuity of state–underworld alliances:

  • Henk Schulte Nordholt, Robert Cribb, Ian Wilson, and Tomáš Petrů have shown that state legitimacy has always been difficult to sustain without recourse to informal or criminal violence427.
  • Debate continues about whether Indonesia’s gangster-ormas synthesis is a form of “uncivil society,” a necessary evil born of weak governance, or a mutant adaptation of patronage-clientelism compatible with democracy29.

4.3. Legal and Social Responses: Ongoing Dilemmas

Efforts to regulate, limit, or abolish abusive ormas have met with mixed results:

  • Provisions to dissolve ormas (Law No. 17/2013, later amended by Perppu No. 2/2017) now allow the government to take swift, sometimes authoritarian measures—but the political will and enforcement often falter amid fears of backlash25.
  • Civil society and anti-corruption campaigners warn that the ormas as legalized preman entities, rather than withering, are being further entrenched through state patronage, corporate partnerships, and ongoing demand for physical enforcement in economic and political life29.

V. Synthesis: Table of Key Events and Their Impact on Legalization & Recognition of Gangsters/Preman

Period/EventDate/PeriodImpact on Preman Legalization/Recognition
Jago/Jawara as social banditsPre-colonial–19th cEstablished model of strongman as local enforcer, precursor to preman networks
Dutch colonial incorporation17th–20th cIntegration of power-brokers in administration; emergence of criminal-political hybrids
Banten Revolt, other rebellions19th cShows recurring insurgency potential, dual role as rebels and state agents
Japanese occupation and revolution1942–49Militias and strongmen mobilized for nationalist causes; criminality blurred with patriotism
Early independence: paramilitaries1950s–60sVigilantes fill policing gap; establish patterns of “outsourced” violence
1965–66 Anti-communist killings1965–66Army-preman alliance; legal impunity; political leverage for preman groups
Creation of Pemuda Pancasila1959+Establishment of state-sanctioned preman organization; “muscle” for politics
Soeharto’s New Order policies1966–98Patronage system legalizes preman groups; ormas as extension of military/state
Petrus/Killings/politics1980sElimination/co-optation strategy; survival through association with legal ormas
Reformasi (Post-1998)1998–presentOrmas explosion, ethnic/religious militias rise; legalized gangsterism persists
Contemporary state responses2010s–2020sRegulatory tightening, anti-preman operations, but embedded structures remain strong

Conclusion: The Enduring Symbiosis of Power and Criminality

The legalization and recognition of gangsters (preman) as mass organizations (ormas) in contemporary Indonesia is not a recent aberration. Rather, it is the latest phase in a power dynamic that has been central to the Indonesian state, society, and economy for centuries. The perpetuation of this model—through colonial collaboration, revolutionary activism, systematic repression, and political patronage—demonstrates the malleability and resilience of strongmen networks.

Vigilantes, paramilitary ormas, and gangsters became institutionalized not only because of the weakness of the state, but because the state itself regarded them as essential partners in projects of nation-building, control, and profit. Their legacy—now codified in thousands of registered organizations and normalized in much of public and economic life—raises pressing challenges for the rule of law, civil society, and democracy in Indonesia today.

Addressing the dangers and pathologies of this system requires more than short-term law enforcement crackdowns. It calls for deep reforms in political culture, accountability, and the upending of patronage structures that have, for generations, given Indonesia’s gangsters a seat at the table of power.

References

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